

What a Musical Work Is

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## WHAT A MUSICAL WORK IS \*

**W**HAT *exactly* did Beethoven compose? That is the question I will begin with. Well, for one, Beethoven composed a quintet for piano and winds (flute, oboe, clarinet, horn) in E-flat, Opus 16, in 1797. But what sort of thing is it, this quintet which was the outcome of Beethoven's creative activity? What does it consist in or of? Shall we say that Beethoven composed actual sounds? No, for sounds die out, but the quintet has endured. Did Beethoven compose a score? No, since many are familiar with Beethoven's composition who have had no contact with its score.<sup>1</sup>

Philosophers have long been puzzled about the identity or nature of the art object in nonphysical arts, e.g., music and literature. In these arts—unlike painting and sculpture—there is no particular physical “thing” that one can plausibly take to be the artwork itself. This puzzlement has sometimes led philosophers (e.g., Croce) to maintain that musical and literary works are purely mental—that they are in fact private intuitive experiences in the minds of composers and poets. But this does not seem likely, since experiences can be neither played nor read nor heard. More generally, the Crocean view puts the objectivity of musical and literary works in dire peril—they become inaccessible and unshareable. Fortunately, however, there is a way of accepting the nonphysicality of such works without undermining their objectivity.

Those familiar with recent reflection on the ontological question for works of art will know of the widespread consensus that a musical work is in fact a variety of abstract object—to wit, a struc-

\* I am indebted to several of my colleagues at the University of Maryland, both past and present, for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.

<sup>1</sup> There are of course several other objections to these proposals, and to the Crocean proposal mentioned below. I do not mean to suggest that those I recall are clearly decisive by themselves.

tural type or kind.<sup>2</sup> Instances of this type are to be found in the individual performances of the work. The type can be heard through its instances, and yet exists independently of its instances. I believe this to be basically correct. A piece of music is *some* sort of structural type, and as such is both nonphysical and publicly available. But *what* sort of type is it? I aim in this paper to say as precisely as I can what structural type it is that a musical work should be identified with.

The most natural and common proposal on this question is that a musical work is a *sound structure*—a structure, sequence, or pattern of sounds, pure and simple.<sup>3</sup> My first objective will be to show that this proposal is deeply unsatisfactory, that a musical work is more than just a sound structure *per se*. I will do this by developing three different objections to the sound-structure view. In the course of developing these objections, three requirements or desiderata for a more adequate view will emerge. The rightness—or at least plausibility—of those requirements will, I think, be apparent at that point. My second objective will then be to suggest a structural type that does satisfy the requirements, and thus can be identified with a musical work.<sup>4</sup>

At the outset, however, I should make clear that I am confining my inquiry to that paradigm of a musical work, the fully notated “classical” composition of Western culture, for example, Beethoven’s Quintet for piano and winds in E-flat, Opus 16. So when I speak of a “musical work” in this paper it should be understood that I am speaking only of these paradigm musical works, and thus that all claims herein regarding musical works are to be construed with this implicit restriction.

<sup>2</sup> See, for example, C. L. Stevenson, “On ‘What Is a Poem?’,” *Philosophical Review*, LXVI, 3 (July 1957): 329–362; J. Margolis, *The Language of Art and Art Criticism* (Detroit: Wayne State UP, 1965); R. Wollheim, *Art and Its Objects* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968).

<sup>3</sup> It should be understood at the outset that sound structure includes not only pitches and rhythms, but also timbres, dynamics, accents—that is, all “purely aural” properties of sound.

<sup>4</sup> The present paper owes a debt to two recent theories of the musical work: N. Wolterstorff, “Toward an Ontology of Artworks,” *Noûs*, ix, 2 (May 1975): 115–142; and K. Walton, “The Presentation and Portrayal of Sound Patterns,” *In Theory Only* (February 1977): 3–16. These writers are aware of some of the considerations that I adduce pointing to the complexity of a musical type. However, I believe they do not take them seriously enough, and thus are inclined to acquiesce in the view that musical works *are* or *may be* just sound structures. The present paper aims squarely to reject that view and to formulate one more adequate.

## I

The first objection to the view that musical works are sound structures is this. If musical works were sound structures, then musical works could not, properly speaking, be created by their composers. For sound structures are types of a pure sort which exist at all times. This is apparent from the fact that they—and the individual component sound types<sup>5</sup> that they comprise—can always have had instances.<sup>6</sup> A sound event conforming to the sound structure of Beethoven's Quintet, Opus 16 logically could have occurred in the Paleozoic era.<sup>7</sup> Less contentiously, perhaps, such an event surely could have taken place in 1760—ten years before Beethoven was born. But if that sound structure was capable of being *instantiated* then, it clearly must have *existed* at that time. Beethoven's compositional activity was not necessary in order for a certain sound-structure type to exist. It was not necessary to the possibility of certain sound events occurring which would be instances of that structure. Sound structures *per se* are not created by being scored—they exist before any compositional activity. Sound structures predate their first instantiation or conception because they are possible of exemplification *before* that point.<sup>8</sup> So, if composers truly create their works—i.e., bring them into existence—then musical works cannot be sound structures.

We can also defend the pre-existence of pure sound structures (i.e., existence prior to any instantiation or conception) in a somewhat different manner. We need only remind ourselves that purely sound structures are in effect mathematical objects—they are *sequences* of sets of sonic elements. (Sonic elements are such as pitches, timbres, durations, etc.). Now if the pre-existence of simple sonic element types be granted—and I think it must be—it follows automatically that all sets and all sequences of sets of these elements also pre-exist. Therefore pure sound structures are pre-existent. But if pure sound structures pre-exist, then it is not open

<sup>5</sup> E.g., F# minor triad, three-note French-dotted rhythmic figure, middle C of bassoon timbre, etc.

<sup>6</sup> This point is made by Wolterstorff, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

<sup>7</sup> Though of course lack of suitable production facilities made this impossible in some nonlogical sense.

<sup>8</sup> I am aware that someone might hold that in saying that a certain novel sound instance is possible at *t*, all we are committed to is that the sound structure of which it *would be* an instance might possibly *come into existence* at *t*, simultaneously with its first instance. But I do not think this a plausible view; in saying that a certain sound event could occur at *t* we are saying something stronger than that the structure it would exemplify might come into existence—we are saying that that structure is right then available.

for them to be objects of creational activity. So again, if composers are truly creators, their works cannot be pure sound structures.<sup>9</sup>

But why should we insist that composers truly create their compositions? Why is this a reasonable requirement? This question needs to be answered. A defense of the desideratum of true creation follows.

The main reason for holding to it is that it is one of the most firmly entrenched of our beliefs concerning art. There is probably no idea more central to thought about art than that it is an activity in which participants create things—these things being artworks. The whole tradition of art assumes art is creative in the strict sense, that it is a godlike activity in which the artist brings into being what did not exist beforehand—much as a demiurge forms a world out of inchoate matter. The notion that artists truly *add* to the world, in company with cake-bakers, house-builders, law-makers, and theory-constructers, is surely a deep-rooted idea that merits preservation if at all possible. The suggestion that some artists, composers in particular, instead merely *discover* or *select* for attention entities they have no hand in creating is so contrary to this basic intuition regarding artists and their works that we have a strong *prima facie* reason to reject it if we can. If it is possible to align musical works with indisputably creatable artworks such as paintings and sculptures, then it seems we should do so.

<sup>9</sup> Some who yet resist the idea that pure sound structures pre-exist compositional activity are possibly failing to distinguish between *structure* and *construction*. It is true that constructions need to have been constructed in order to exist; it does not follow that structures need to have been constructed—i.e., actually put together from parts—in order to exist. The Brooklyn Bridge is a construction, and embodies a structure. The Brooklyn Bridge did not exist before its construction. But the geometrical structure it embodies, which required and received no construction, has always existed.

Given that there will still be some who are attracted to the view that pure sound structures are in some way created by composers, presumably through mental activity, and that these are their works, I will take this occasion to point out briefly two untoward consequences of such a view. The first is that instances of pure sound structures can always have been sounded accidentally before any composer thinks them into existence by directing his attention on the realm of sounds. In which case we would then be countenancing compositions that have instances before those compositions begin to exist. The second is that a person who conceives or sketches a sound structure new to him has no (logical) assurance that he has in fact composed *anything*. For if composing is bringing sound structures into existence, one may fail to do so in writing a score, provided someone else has conceived the same structure earlier. Notice that this is not a matter of the latecomer having composed the *same* work as his predecessor, but rather—what he and we would surely find incredible—a matter of his having composed *no* work at all.

A second, closely related reason to preserve true creation vis-à-vis musical works is that some of the status, significance, and value we attach to musical composition derives from our belief in this. If we conceive of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony as existing sempiternally, before Beethoven's compositional act, a small part of the glory that surrounds Beethoven's composition of the piece seems to be removed. There is a special glow that envelops composers, as well as other artists, because we think of them as true creators. We marvel at a great piece of music *in part* because we marvel that, had its composer not engaged in a certain activity, the piece would (almost surely) not now exist; but it does exist, and we are grateful to the composer for precisely that. Ecclesiastes was wrong—there *are* ever some things new under the sun, musical compositions being among the most splendid of them—and splendid, at least in part, in virtue of this absolute newness.

Shall we then accept the creatability requirement as suggested? Before we do so a last qualm should be addressed. It is open for someone to admit the importance of musical composition being characterized by true creation and yet waive the creatability of works themselves. Such a person will point to entities associated with the compositional process which composers unequivocally bring into existence—e.g., thoughts, scores, performances—and claim that true creation need be extended no further. Now it is certainly true that these entities are strictly created, and we may also accord composers some recognition of their creativity in regard to these things. But the fact of the matter remains that *works* are the main items, the center and aim of the whole enterprise, and that since musical works are not identical with scores, performances, or thoughts,<sup>10</sup> if those are the only things actually created, then much is lost. “Composers are true creators” acquires a hollow ring. Creation in music shrinks to an outer veneer with no inner core.

I propose then that a most adequate account of the musical work should satisfy the following requirement, that of *creatability*<sup>11</sup>:

- (Cre) Musical works must be such that they do *not* exist prior to the composer's compositional activity, but are *brought into* existence *by* that activity.

<sup>10</sup> Though composers compose their works *by* writing scores, having thoughts, or, less typically, producing performances.

<sup>11</sup> It would be well to note here that, even if one rejects the requirement of creatability, abandonment of the sound-structure view in favor of something like the view I eventually propose will be demanded by the second and third requirements developed. And those requirements strike me as being nonnegotiable.

## II

The second objection to the view that musical works are sound structures is this. (1) If musical works were just sound structures, then, if two distinct composers determine the same sound structure, they necessarily compose the same musical work. (2) But distinct composers determining the same sound structure in fact inevitably produce different musical works.<sup>12</sup> Therefore, musical works cannot be sound structures *simpliciter*. The rest of this section is devoted to supporting and elucidating the second premise of this argument.

Composers who produce identical scores in the same notational system with the same conventions of interpretation will determine the same sound structure. But the musical works they thereby compose will generally not be the same. The reason for this is that certain attributes of musical works are dependent on more than the sound structures contained. In particular, the aesthetic and artistic attributes of a piece of music are partly a function of, and must be gauged with reference to, the total musico-historical context in which the composer is situated while composing his piece. Since the musico-historical contexts of composing individuals are invariably different, then even if their works are identical in sound structure, they will differ widely in aesthetic and artistic attributes. But then, by Leibniz's law, the musical works themselves must be non-identical; if  $W_1$  has any attribute that  $W_2$  lacks, or *vice versa*, then  $W_1 \neq W_2$ .

I will not attempt to give a strict definition of musico-historical context, but will confine myself to pointing out a large part of what is involved in it. The total musico-historical context of a composer  $P$  at a time  $t$  can be said to include at least the following: (a) the whole of cultural, social, and political history prior to  $t$ ,<sup>13</sup> (b) the whole of musical development up to  $t$ , (c) musical styles prevalent at  $t$ , (d) dominant musical influences at  $t$ , (e) musical activities of  $P$ 's contemporaries at  $t$ , (f)  $P$ 's apparent style at  $t$ , (g)  $P$ 's

<sup>12</sup> Notice that if we assume that composing musical works is strictly creating them, it follows immediately that two composers cannot compose the very same musical work (no matter what sound structures they determine) unless they are either composing jointly or composing independently but simultaneously. This is just a consequence of the fact that the same thing cannot be created both at  $t$  and at a later time  $t'$ . (The same goes for a single composer on temporally separate occasions; if composing is creating, a composer cannot compose the same work twice.) I will not, however, in this section assume that composing is strict creation.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. J. L. Borges, "Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote" [in *Labyrinths* (New York: New Directions, 1962)] for a fictional demonstration of the dependence of artistic meaning on the historical context of creation.

musical repertoire<sup>14</sup> at *t*, (h) *P*'s oeuvre at *t*, (i) musical influences operating on *P* at *t*. These factors contributing to the total musico-historical context might be conveniently divided into two groups, a-d and e-i. The former, which we could call the *general* musico-historical context, consists of factors relevant to anyone's composing at *t*; the latter, which we could call the *individual* musico-historical context, consists of factors relevant specifically to *P*'s composing at *t*. In any event, all these factors operate to differentiate aesthetically or artistically musical works identical in sound structure, thus making it impossible to identify those works with their sound structures. I now provide several illustrations of this.<sup>15</sup>

(1) A work identical in sound structure with Schoenberg's *Pierrot Lunaire* (1912), but composed by Richard Strauss in 1897 would be aesthetically different from Schoenberg's work. Call it 'Pierrot Lunaire\*'. As a Straussian work, *Pierrot Lunaire\** would follow hard upon Brahms's *German Requiem*, would be contemporaneous with Debussy's *Nocturnes*, and would be taken as the next step in Strauss's development after *Also Sprach Zarathustra*. As such it would be more *bizarre*, more *upsetting*, more *anguished*, more *eerie* even than Schoenberg's work, since perceived against a musical tradition, a field of current styles, and an oeuvre with respect to which the musical characteristics of the sound structure involved in *Pierrot Lunaire* appear doubly extreme.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Wollheim, *op. cit.*, pp. 48–54, for a discussion of the dependence of a work's expression on the artistic repertoire of the artist. The notion of "repertoire" is roughly that of a set of alternative decisions or choices within which an artist appears to be operating in creating his works. Wollheim extracts this idea from E. K. Gombrich's discussions of artistic expression in *Art and Illusion* and *Meditations on a Hobby-Horse*.

<sup>15</sup> The convincingness of these examples depends crucially on accepting something like the following principle: "Works of art *truly have* those attributes which they *appear* to have when *correctly* perceived or regarded." I cannot provide a defense of this principle here, but it has been well argued for by C. Stevenson, "Interpretation and Evaluation in Aesthetics" [in W. E. Kennick, *Art and Philosophy* (New York: St. Martin's, 1964)], and Walton, "Categories of Art," *Philosophical Review*, LXVI, 3 (July 1970): 334–367, among others.

<sup>16</sup> It is a mistake to regard this illustration as concerned with what *Pierrot Lunaire* would have been like if *it* had been composed by Strauss. (I am not even sure what *that* supposition amounts to.) The illustration rather concerns a possible musical work that possesses the same sound structure as *Pierrot Lunaire*, but is composed by Strauss in 1897. This work would be distinct from *Pierrot Lunaire*, because aesthetically divergent. But if musical works were identified with sound structures it could *not* be distinct.

Another way of casting the argument using this example would be as follows. Consider a possible world *Q* in which both Schoenberg's *Pierrot Lunaire* and Strauss's *Pierrot Lunaire\** exist, and call the sound structure they have in common "*K*." In *Q*, the works diverge aesthetically and hence are non-identical.

(2) Mendelssohn's *Midsummer's Night Dream Overture* (1826) is admitted by all to be a highly *original* piece of music. Music of such elfin delicacy and feel for tone color had never before been written. But a score written in 1900 detailing the very same sound structure as is found in Mendelssohn's piece would clearly result in a work that was surpassingly *unoriginal*.

(3) Brahms's Piano Sonata Opus 2 (1852), an early work, is strongly *Liszt-influenced*, as any perceptive listener can discern. However, a work identical with it in sound structure, but written by Beethoven, could hardly have had the property of being *Liszt-influenced*. And it would have had a visionary quality that Brahms's piece does not have.

(4) The symphonies of Johann Stamitz (1717–1757) are generally regarded as seminal works in the development of orchestral music. They employ many attention-getting devices novel for their time, one of which is known as the "Mannheim rocket"—essentially a loud ascending scale figure for unison strings. A symphony of Stamitz containing Mannheim rockets and the like is an *exciting* piece of music. But a piece written today which was identical in sound structure with one of Stamitz's symphonies, Mannheim rockets and all, would not be so much exciting as it would be exceedingly *funny*. Stamitz's symphony is to be heard in the context of Stamitz's earlier works, the persistence of late Baroque style, the contemporary activities of the young Mozart, and the Napoleonic wars. "Modern Stamitz"'s symphony would be heard in the context of "Modern Stamitz"'s earlier works (which are probably dodecaphonic), the existence of aleatory and electronic music, the musical enterprises both of Pierre Boulez and of Elton John, and the threat of nuclear annihilation.

(5) One of the passages in Bartok's *Concerto for Orchestra* (1943) satirizes Shostakovich's *Seventh Symphony* ("Leningrad") of 1941, whose bombast was apparently not to Bartok's liking. A theme from that symphony is quoted and commented on musically in an

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Clearly, the works cannot both be identified with their common sound structure, but to so identify only one of them would be perfectly arbitrary. So in *Q*, *Pierrot Lunaire* ≠ *K*. But then in the actual world as well, *Pierrot Lunaire* ≠ *K*. Why? Owing to the necessity that attaches to identity and difference. If two things are non-identical in any possible world, they are non-identical in every possible world in which they exist. Put otherwise, statements of identity and difference involving rigid designators are necessary. 'Pierrot Lunaire' and '*K*' designate rigidly; they are proper names, not definite descriptions. Thus 'Pierrot Lunaire' ≠ *K*' is necessarily true, since true in *Q*. Therefore, in the actual world, *Pierrot Lunaire* ≠ *K*. [The argument can be recast in this way, *mutatis mutandis*, for illustrations (2)–(5) as well.]

unmistakable manner. But notice that if Bartok had written the very same score in 1939, the work he would then have composed could not have had the same property of satirizing Shostakovitch's *Seventh Symphony*. Nor would the work that would have resulted from Shostakovitch's penning that score in 1943.

These examples should serve to convince the reader that there is always some aesthetic or artistic difference between structurally identical compositions in the offing in virtue of differing musico-historical contexts. Even small differences in musico-historical context—e.g., an extra work in *P*'s oeuvre, a slight change in style dominant in *P*'s milieu, some musical influence deleted from *P*'s development as a composer—seem certain to induce some change in kind or degree in some aesthetic or artistic quality, however difficult it might be in such cases to pinpoint this change verbally.

For example, suppose there had been a composer (call him "Toenburg") in 1912 identical with Schoenberg in all musico-historical respects—e.g., birthdate, country, style, musical development, artistic intentions, etc., except that Toenburg had never written anything like *Verklarte Nacht* though he had in his oeuvre works structurally identical with everything else Schoenberg wrote before 1912. Now suppose simultaneously with Schoenberg he sketches the sound structure of *Pierrot Lunaire*. Toenburg has not produced the same musical work as Schoenberg, I maintain, if only because his work has a slightly different aesthetic/artistic content owing to the absence of a Verklarte-Nacht-ish piece in Toenburg's oeuvre. Schoenberg's *Pierrot Lunaire* is properly heard with reference to Schoenberg's oeuvre in 1912, and Toenberg's *Pierrot Lunaire* with reference to Toenburg's oeuvre in 1912. One thus hears something in Schoenberg's piece by virtue of resonance with *Verklarte Nacht* that is not present in Toenberg's piece—perhaps a stronger reminiscence of Expressionist sighs?

Before formulating a second requirement of adequacy, as suggested by the fatal problem that contextual differentiation poses for the equation of musical works with pure sound structures, I must confront an objection that may be lurking in the wings. The objection in short is that the aesthetic and artistic differences I have been discussing are not really an obstacle to equating works and sound structures, because these supposed differences between *works* due to compositional context really just boil down to facts about their *composers*, and are not attributes of works at all. The objection is understandable, but I find it rather unconvincing for several reasons which I will briefly detail.

(1) Artistic and aesthetic attributions made of musical works are as direct and undisguised as attributions typically made of composers. It seems to be as straightforwardly true that the Eroica symphony is noble, bold, original, revolutionary, influenced by Haydn, and reflective of Beethoven's thoughts about Napoleon, as it is that Beethoven had certain personal qualities, was a genius, changed the course of western music, studied with Haydn, and at one point idolized Napoleon. (2) Whereas we may admit some plausibility to reducing artistic attributions (e.g., 'original', 'influenced by Haydn') to attributes of persons, there is no plausibility in so reducing aesthetic attributions; it is absurd to maintain that "*W* is scintillating," for example, is just a way of saying "*W*'s composer is scintillating." (3) Finally, in the case of artistic attributions, not only do they appear as entrenched and legitimate as parallel attributions to composers, but, if anything, they often seem to be primary. Consider originality, for example, and imagine a composer and oeuvre that possess it. Surely the composer is original because *his works* are original; his works are not original because *he is*.

I thus propose a second requirement—that of *fine individuation*—to which any acceptable theory of the musical work should conform:

- (Ind) Musical works must be such that composers composing in different musico-historical contexts<sup>17</sup> who determine identical sound structures invariably compose distinct musical works.

### III

The third objection to the view that musical works are sound structures is this. If musical works were simply sound structures, then they would not essentially involve any particular means of performance. But the paradigm musical works that we are investigating in this paper, e.g., Beethoven's Quintet Opus 16, clearly *do* involve quite specific means of performance, i.e., particular instruments, in an essential way. The instrumentation of musical works is an integral part of those works. So musical works cannot be simply sound structures *per se*. Arguments in defense of the claim that performance means are an essential component of musical works now follow.

(1) Composers do not describe pure sound patterns in qualitative terms, leaving their means of production undiscussed. Rather, what they directly specify are means of production, through which a pure sound pattern is indirectly indicated. The score of Beetho-

<sup>17</sup> This includes a single composer on separate occasions.

ven's Quintet, Opus 16, is not a recipe for providing an instance of a sound pattern *per se*, in whatever way you might like. Rather, it instructs one to produce an instance of a certain sound pattern through carrying out certain operations on certain instruments. When Beethoven writes a middle C for the oboe, he has done more than require an oboe-like sound at a certain pitch—he has called for such a sound as emanating from that quaint reed we call an “oboe.” The idea that composers of the last 300 years were generally engaged in composing pure sound patterns, to which they were usually kind enough to append suggestions as to how they might be realized, is highly implausible. Composers are familiar with tone colors only insofar as they are familiar with instruments that possess them. We do not find composers creating pure combinations of tone color, and then later searching about for instruments that can realize or approximate these aural canvases; it would obviously be pointless or at least frustrating to do so. Composers often call for complex sounds that they have never heard before and can scarcely imagine—e.g., the sound of two trombones and three piccolos intoning middle C while four saxophones and five xylophones intone the C-sharp a half-step above; it is obvious here that what is primarily composed is not a pure untethered sound but an instrumental combination.<sup>18</sup>

(2) Scores are generally taken to be definitive of musical works, at least in conjunction with the conventions of notational interpretation assumed to be operative at the time of composition. It is

<sup>18</sup> It is inevitable that someone will object at this point that certain composers, in certain periods, did not compose with definite instruments in mind and did not make specific instrumentation integral to their works. This may be true to some extent. But two points must be noted. First, I have set out to define the nature of the *paradigmatic* musical composition in Western culture, of which Beethoven's Quintet, Opus 16 is an example. It is enough for my purpose that most “classical” compositions, and effectively all from 1750 to the present, integrally involve quite definite means of performance. Second, even in a case such as J. S. Bach, where controversy has long existed as to exactly what performing forces Bach intended, called for, or would have allowed in such compositions as *The Well-Tempered Clavier* or the Brandenburg Concerto No. 2, it is clear there are still more restrictions as to performing forces which must be considered part of those compositions. Thus, *The Well-Tempered Clavier* may not be a work belonging solely to the harpsichord (as opposed to the clavichord or fortepiano), but it is clearly a work for *keyboard*, and a performance of its sound structure on five violins would just for that reason not be a performance of *it*. And although the performance component of the Brandenburg Concerto No. 2 may be indeterminate between a trumpet and a natural horn in that prominent instrumental part, it certainly excludes the alto saxophone. Finally, a composition such as Bach's *Art of the Fugue*, for which perhaps no means of sound production are either prescribed or proscribed, is in this context merely the exception that proves the rule.

hard to miss the fact that scores of musical works call for specific instruments in no uncertain terms. When we read in Beethoven's score the demand 'clarinet' (rather, 'Klarinet') we may wonder whether a clarinet of 1970 vintage and construction will do as well as one of 1800, but we have still been given a fairly definite idea of what sort of instrument is required. There is nothing in scores themselves that suggests that instrumental specifications are to be regarded as optional—any more than specifications of pitch, rhythm, or dynamics. Nor does the surrounding musical practice of the time encourage such a way of regarding them.<sup>19</sup> If we are not to abandon the principle that properly understood scores have a central role in determining the identity of musical works, then we must insist that the Quintet, Op. 16, without a clarinet is not the same piece—even if all sound-structural characteristics (including timbre) are preserved. To feel free to disregard as prominent an aspect of scores as performing means is to leave it open for someone to disregard any aspect of a score he does not wish to conform to—e.g., tempo, accidentals, accents, articulation, harmony—and claim that one nevertheless has the same work.<sup>20</sup> The only way it seems one could justify regarding performing-means specifications as just optional features of scores is to simply *assume* that musical works are nothing but sound structures *per se*.

Consider a sound event aurally indistinguishable from a typical performance of Beethoven's Quintet Opus 16, but issuing from a versatile synthesizer, or perhaps a piano plus a set of newly designed wind instruments, two hundred in number, each capable of just two or three notes. If performance means were not an integral aspect of a musical work, then there would be no question that this sound event constitutes a performance of Beethoven's Quintet Opus 16. But there is indeed such a question. It makes perfect sense to deny that it is such a performance on the grounds that the sounds heard did not derive from a piano and four standard woodwinds. We can count something as a performance of Beethoven's Quintet Opus 16 only if it involves the participation of the instruments for which the piece was written—or better—of the instruments that were written into the piece.

<sup>19</sup> This should not be confounded with the fact that many composers were ready and willing to adapt their works in response to exigencies—in short, to license transcriptions.

<sup>20</sup> This is not to say that *everything* found in scores is constitutive of musical works. Some markings do not fix the identity of a work but are instead of the nature of advice, inspiration, helpful instruction, etc. However, the suggestion that instrumental specifications are of this sort is totally insupportable.

(3) To regard performing means as essential to musical works is to maintain that the sound structure of a work cannot be divorced from the instruments and voices through which that structure is fixed, and regarded as the work itself. The strongest reason why it cannot be so divorced is that the aesthetic content of a musical work is determined not only by its sound structure, and not only by its musico-historical context, but also in part by the actual means of production chosen for making that structure audible. The character of a musical composition, e.g., Beethoven's Quintet Opus 16 for piano and winds, is partly a function of how its sound structure relates to the potentialities of a certain instrument or set of instruments designated to produce that structure for audition. To assess that character correctly one must take cognizance not only of the qualitative nature of sounds heard but also of their source of origin. Musical compositions, by and large, have reasonably definite characters; that is to say, we can and do ascribe to them many fairly specific aesthetic qualities. But if prescribed performing forces were not intrinsic to musical compositions, then those compositions would not have the reasonably definite characters we clearly believe them to have. The determinateness of a work's aesthetic qualities is in peril if performing means are viewed as inessential so long as exact sound structure is preserved.

Consider a musical work  $W$  with specified performing means  $M$  which has some fairly specific aesthetic quality  $\phi$ . The sound structure of  $W$  as produced by different performing means  $N$ , however, will invariably strike us either as not  $\phi$  at all, or else as  $\phi$  to a greater or lesser degree than before. Therefore, if means of sound production are not regarded as an integral part of musical works, then  $W$  cannot be said determinately to have the attribute  $\phi$ . So if we wish to preserve a wide range of determinate aesthetic attributions, we must recognize performing means to be an essential component of musical works. I now provide two illustrations of this point.<sup>21</sup>

(a) Beethoven's Hammerklavier Sonata is a sublime, craggy, and heaven-storming piece of music. The closing passages (marked by ascending chordal trills) are surely among the most imposing and awesome in all music. However, if we understand the very sounds of the Hammerklavier Sonata to originate from a full-range synthesizer, as opposed to a mere 88-key piano of metal, wood, and felt, it no longer seems so sublime, so craggy, so awesome. The

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Walton, "Categories of Art," *op. cit.*, pp. 349/50, for related examples.

aesthetic qualities of the Hammerklavier Sonata depend in part on the strain that its sound structure imposes on the sonic capabilities of the piano; if we are not hearing its sound structure *as* produced by a piano then we are not sensing this strain, and thus our assessment of aesthetic content is altered. The closing passages of the Hammerklavier are awesome in part because we seem to hear the piano bursting at the seams and its keyboard on the verge of exhaustion. On a 10-octave electronic synthesizer those passages do not have quite that quality, and a hearing of them with knowledge of source is an aesthetically different experience. The lesson here applies, I believe, to all musical works (of the paradigm sort). Their aesthetic attributes always depends, if not so dramatically, in part on the performing forces understood to belong to them.

(b) Consider a baroque concerto for two violins, such as Bach's Concerto in D minor, BWV1043. In such pieces one often finds a phrase (A) assigned to one violin, which is immediately followed by the *very same* phrase (B) assigned to the other violin. Now when one hears such passages *as* issuing from *two* violins (even if in a given performance there are no discernible differences between A and B in timbre or phrasing), a sense of question-and-answer, of relaxation and unhurriedness is communicated. But if one were to construe such passages as issuing from a *single* violin, that quality would be absent, and in its place the passages would assume a more emphatic, insistent, and repetitive cast.

(4) The dependence of aesthetic attributes on assumed or understood performing forces should now be apparent. The dependence of artistic attributes is even more plain. (a) Consider Paganini's Caprice Opus 1, No. 17. This piece surely deserves and receives the attribution 'virtuosic'. But if we did not conceive of the Caprice No. 17 as essentially for the violin, as inherently a *violin piece* (and not just a *violin-sounding piece*), then it would not merit that attribution. For, as executed by a computer or by some novel string instrument using nonviolinistic technique, its sound structure might not be particularly difficult to get through. (b) Imagine a piece written for violin to be played in such a way that certain passages sound more like a flute than they do like a violin. Such a piece would surely be accounted *unusual*, and to some degree, *original* as well. Understood as a piece for violin and occasional flute, however, it might have nothing unusual or original about it at all. Retaining the sound structure while setting actual performance means adrift completely dissolves part of the piece's artistic import.

(c) According to one respected critic, Beethoven in the Quintet Opus 16 was interested in solving problems of balance between piano and winds—a nominally incompatible array of instruments—and succeeded in his own individual way.<sup>22</sup> It is not hard to agree with this assessment; thus, ‘solves the problem of balance between piano and winds’ is an attribution true of Beethoven’s Quintet. It is difficult to see how this would be so if the Quintet is purely a sound structure, if piano and winds are not strictly part of the piece at all.<sup>23</sup>

I thus propose a third requirement for any account of the musical work: *inclusion of performance means*:

(Per) Musical works must be such that specific means of performance or sound production are integral to them.

#### IV

If musical works are not sound structures *simpliciter*, then what are they? The type that is a musical work must be capable of being created, must be individuated by context of composition, and must be inclusive of means of performance. The third desideratum is most easily met, and will be addressed first.

I propose that a musical work be taken to involve not only a pure sound structure, but also a structure of performing means. If the sound structure of a piece is basically a sequence of sounds qualitatively defined, then the performing-means structure is a parallel sequence of performing means specified for realizing the sounds at each point. Thus a musical work consists of at least two structures. It is a compound or conjunction of a sound structure and a performing-means structure. This compound is itself just a more complex structure; call it an “S/PM” structure, for short.<sup>24</sup> Beethoven’s Opus 16 Quintet is at base an S/PM structure; the means of producing the sounds belonging to it are no more dis-

<sup>22</sup> James Lyons, liner notes, phonograph record *Nonesuch* 71054.

<sup>23</sup> The best one could say would be that the Quintet achieved a satisfactory blending of piano-ish sounds and woodwind-ish sounds.

<sup>24</sup> One could alternatively speak of a single structure which, construed rightly, entails both the required sounds and the required means of sound production. This would be a structure of *performed sounds*, as opposed to “pure” sounds. For example, one such *performed sound* would correspond to the following specification: “Middle C of half-note duration played on oboe.” Clearly this implies both a certain sound qualitatively defined and a means of producing it.

The main reason I favor the S/PM formulation is that it is more transparent. It preserves some continuity with the sound-structure view which it supersedes, and displays more clearly than the performed-sound formulation that, although a musical work is *more* than a sound structure, it most definitely *includes* a sound structure.

pensable to its identity as a composition than the nature and order of those sounds themselves. This satisfies requirement (Per).

To satisfy the first and second requirements of adequacy we arrived at, it is necessary to realize that a musical work is not a structure of the *pure* sort at all, and thus not even a S/PM structure *simpliciter*. A S/PM structure is no more creatable or context-individuated than a sound structure is. I propose that we recognize a musical work to be a more complicated entity, namely this:

(MW)      S/PM structure-as-indicated-by-X-at-t

where  $X$  is a particular person—the composer—and  $t$  is the time of composition. For the paradigmatic pieces we are concerned with, the composer typically indicates (fixes, determines, selects) an S/PM structure by creating a score. The *piece* he thereby composes is the S/PM structure-as-indicated by him on that occasion.

An S/PM structure-as-indicated-by-X-at-t, unlike an S/PM structure *simpliciter*, does not pre-exist the activity of composition and is thus capable of being created. When a composer  $\theta$  composes a piece of music, he indicates an S/PM structure  $\psi$ , but he does not bring  $\psi$  into being. However, through the act of indicating  $\psi$ , he does bring into being something that did not previously exist—namely,  $\psi$ -as-indicated-by- $\theta$ -at- $t_1$ . Before the compositional act at  $t_1$ , no relation obtains between  $\theta$  and  $\psi$ . Composition establishes the relation of indication between  $\theta$  and  $\psi$ . As a result of the compositional act, I suggest, the world contains a new entity,  $\psi$ -as-indicated-by- $\theta$ -at- $t_1$ . Let me call such entities *indicated structures*. And let me represent indicated structures by expressions of form “S/PM\* $\alpha$ \* $t$ .” It is important to realize that indicated structures are entities distinct from the pure structures *per se* from which they are derived. Thus, in particular,  $\psi^*\theta^*t_1$  is not just the structure  $\psi$  with the accidental property of having been indicated by  $\theta$  at  $t_1$ — $\psi^*\theta^*t_1$  and  $\psi$  are strictly non-identical, though of course related.  $\psi^*\theta^*t_1$ , unlike  $\psi$ , can be and is created through  $\theta$ ’s composing. Thus requirement (Cre) is satisfied.

Indicated structures also serve to satisfy our second requirement (Ind). If musical works are indicated structures of the sort we have suggested, then two such works,  $\psi^*\theta^*t_1$  and  $\alpha^*\phi^*t_2$  are identical iff (i)  $\psi = \alpha$ , (ii)  $\theta = \phi$ , and (iii)  $t_1 = t_2$ . But if musical works are necessarily distinct if composed either by different people or at different times, then it certainly follows that works composed in different musico-historical contexts will be distinct, since any difference of musico-historical context from one work to another can be traced

to a difference of composer or time or both. Put otherwise, musico-historical context (as explained in section II) is a function of time and person; given a time and person, musico-historical context is fixed. So requirement (Ind) is satisfied. That it is satisfied by our proposal with something to spare is a matter I will return to in section V. I now endeavor to increase the reader's grasp of what indicated structures are.

Indicated structures are a different class of type from pure structures. Types of the latter class we may call *implicit* types, and those of the former class *initiated* types. *Implicit* types include all purely abstract structures that are not inconsistent, e.g., geometrical figures, family relationships, strings of words, series of moves in chess, ways of placing five balls in three bins, etc. By calling them "implicit types" I mean to suggest that their existence is implicitly granted when a general framework of possibilities is given. For example, given that there is space, there are all the possible configurations in space; given there is the game of chess, there are all the possible combinations of allowed moves. Sound structures *simpliciter* are clearly implicit types. Given that there are sounds of various kinds, then all possible patterns and sequences of those sounds must be granted existence immediately as well. For a sound structure, in company with all pure structures, is always capable of instantiation before the point at which it is noticed, recognized, mentioned, or singled out. And thus its existence must predate that point. The same goes for a performance-means structure *simpliciter*. Given performing means (i.e., instruments) of various kinds, then all possible combinations and sequences of such means exist as well. The compound of these two, a sound/performance-means structure, thus of course also counts as an implicit type.

The other class of types, *initiated* types, are so called because they begin to exist only when they are initiated by an intentional human act of some kind. All those of interest can, I think, be construed as arising from an operation, like indication, performed upon a pure structure. Typically, this indication is effected by producing an exemplar of the structure involved, or a blueprint of it. In so indicating (or determining) the structure, the exemplar or blueprint inaugurates the type which is the *indicated* structure, the structure-as-indicated-by-x-at-t. All indicated structures are, perforce, initiated types.

Initiated types include such types as the Ford Thunderbird, the Lincoln penny, the hedgehog. The Ford Thunderbird is not simply

a pure structure of metal, glass, and plastic. The pure structure that is embodied in the Thunderbird has existed *at least* since the invention of plastic (1870); there could certainly have been instances of it in 1900. But the Ford Thunderbird was created in 1957; so there could not have been instances of the Thunderbird in 1900. The Ford Thunderbird is an *initiated* type; it is a metal/glass/plastic structure-as-indicated (or determined) by the Ford Motor Company on such and such a date. It begins to exist as a result of an act of human indication or determination. The instances of this type are more than just instances of a pure structure—they are instances of an indicated structure. The Lincoln penny is similarly not a pure structure, an abstract pattern *tout court*, but a structure-as-indicated, a pattern-as-denominated-by-the-U.S. Government. Objects conforming to the pattern *tout court* but existing in 100 A.D. in Imperial Rome would not be instances of the Lincoln penny. Even the hedgehog is probably best understood, not as a pure biological structure, but rather as a biological structure-as-determined-or-fixed by natural terrestrial evolution at a particular point in history. The creatures we call "hedgehogs" possess a certain structure and stand in certain causal relations to some particular creatures which came into existence at a given past date. The biological structure of the hedgehog might have been instantiated in the Mesozoic era, or on Uranus, but nothing existing at that time, or at that place, could be an instance of the hedgehog as we understand it. Musical works, as I have suggested, are indicated structures too, and thus types that do not already exist but must instead be initiated. The same is true of poems, plays, and novels—each of these is an entity more individual and temporally bound than the pure verbal structure embodied in it.

The distinction between indicated structure and pure structure can perhaps be made clearer by analogy with the distinction between sentence and statement long enshrined in the philosophy of language.<sup>25</sup> These distinctions are motivated in similar ways. Statements were recognized partly in response to the need for entities individuated in some respects more finely than sentences, in order to provide bearers for the varying truth values that turned up in connection with a given sentence on different occasions.<sup>26</sup> Just so, indicated structures are recognized in response to the need for entities more finely individuated than pure structures, in order to

<sup>25</sup> This analogy was brought to my attention by Warren Ingber.

<sup>26</sup> See, for example, J. L. Austin's "Truth," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, supp. vol. xxiv (1950): 111–128.

provide bearers for various incompatible sets of aesthetic, artistic, cultural, semantic, and genetic properties. We allow that a given sentence can make different statements when uttered in different circumstances. Similarly, we realize that a given sound/perform-ance-means structure yields different indicated structures, or musical works, when indicated in different musico-historical contexts.<sup>27</sup>

## v

I have proposed that musical works be identified with rather specific indicated structures, in which a particular person and time figure ineliminably. The proposal MW was made, recall, in order to satisfy the creatability and individuation requirements. However, as I noted at that point, MW satisfies the individuation requirement with logical room to spare. Perhaps both requirements can be satisfied without invoking types that are quite so particularized? The obvious alternative is that a musical work is this sort of type:

(MW') S/PM structure-as-indicated-in-musico-historical-context-*C*

Such types would be both creatable and sufficiently individuated. A type of this sort, like an MW type, comes into existence through some *actual* indication of an S/PM structure by a person at a time —a person who at that certain time is situated in a particular context. But the type's identity is not inherently tied to that of any individual as such. Thus, two composers composing simultaneously but independently in the same musico-historical context who determine the same S/PM structure create *distinct* MW types, but the *same* MW' type.

Given these two proposals, then, which satisfy all our desiderata, do we have reason to prefer one or the other? I will discuss one consideration in favor of MW', and three considerations in favor of MW.

(1) On the MW' proposal, it is at least logically possible for a musical work to have been composed by a person other than the person who actually composed it. If *A* is the actual composer of a musical work,  $\psi$ -as-indicated-in-*C*<sub>1</sub>, then all we need imagine is that someone other than *A* was the person to first indicate the S/PM structure  $\psi$  in musico-historical context *C*<sub>1</sub>. On the MW proposal, however, it becomes *logically impossible* for a work to have been composed by other than its actual composer. Could someone else have composed Beethoven's Quintet Opus 16, according to MW?

<sup>27</sup> The analogy might even be reversed, so as to illuminate the nature of statements. If musical works are structures-as-indicated . . . , then possibly statements just are: sentences-as-uttered . . .

For example, could Hummel have done so? No, because if  $\psi$  is the S/PM structure of the Quintet Opus 16, then all that Hummel might have composed is  $\psi$ -as-indicated-by-Hummel-in-1797, and not  $\psi$ -as-indicated-by-Beethoven-in-1797.<sup>28</sup> It must be admitted to be somewhat counterintuitive for a theory to make the composer of a work essential to that work.

(2) We can turn this consequence upside-down, however. One might cite as a virtue of the MW proposal that it gives a composer *logical insurance* that his works are his very own, that no one else has or ever could compose a work identical to any of his. If  $A$ 's musical work is an MW type, then even a fellow composer situated in an identical musico-historical context determining the same S/PM structure composes a distinct musical work. It seems to me this is a desirable consequence, from the point of view of preserving the uniqueness of compositional activity. Why should a composer have to fear, however abstractly, that his work is not exclusively his, any more than a painter painting a painting or a sculptor sculpting a sculpture need be troubled about whether his work is at least numerically distinct from anyone else's? Why not adopt a construal of 'musical work' (and of 'poem', 'novel', 'dance', etc.) which, while maintaining musical works as abstract types, guarantees this individuation by artist for them as well? Considerations (1) and (2) thus appear to fairly well cancel each other out.

(3) A more decisive reason, however, for ensuring by proposal MW that composers  $A$  and  $B$  who determine the same S/PM structure in the same musico-historical context yet compose distinct works  $W_1$  and  $W_2$ , is that, although  $W_1$  and  $W_2$  do not, it seems, differ structurally or aesthetically or artistically at the time of composition  $t$ , differences of an artistic sort are almost certain to develop after  $t$ . So, unless we wish to embrace the awkwardness of saying that two musical works can be identical when composed, but non-identical at some later point, we have a strong incentive to adopt MW.  $W_1$  and  $W_2$  will almost certainly diverge artistically because of the gross improbability that  $A$  and  $B$  will continue to be subject to the exact same influences to the same degree and that  $A$ 's and  $B$ 's oeuvres will continue to appear identical after the composition of  $W_1$  and  $W_2$ . If  $A$ 's and  $B$ 's artistic careers do exhibit these differences after  $t$ , then  $W_1$  and  $W_2$  will acquire somewhat different artistic significance, since  $W_1$  will eventually be seen prop-

<sup>28</sup> I am assuming, of course, that Hummel could not possibly have *been* Beethoven. If he *could* have, then I suppose that, even on MW, Hummel might have composed Beethoven's Quintet.

erly against *A*'s total development, and *W*<sub>2</sub> against *B*'s total development. *W*<sub>1</sub> may turn out to be a *seminal work*, whereas *W*<sub>2</sub> turns out to be a *false start*. Or *W*<sub>1</sub> may turn out to be *much more influential* than *W*<sub>2</sub>, owing to the fact that *A* comes to be much better known than *B*. In any case, there will be *some* divergence in artistic attributions, if not always so marked, unless *A* and *B* remain artistic duplicates of one another throughout their lives (and thereafter). Since circumstances subsequent to a work's composition are not comprised in musico-historical context of composition, proposal MW' leaves us open for the awkwardness mentioned above. MW forestalls this problem completely.<sup>29</sup>

(4) A last consideration inclining us to MW comprises certain intuitions concerning what would count as a performance of what. It seems that, in order for a performance to be a performance of *W*, not only must it fit and be intended to fit the S/PM structure of *A*'s work *W*; there must also be some *connection*, more or less direct, between the sound event produced and *A*'s creative activity. Whether this is primarily an intentional or causal connection is a difficult question,<sup>30</sup> but, unless it is present, I think we are loath to say that *A*'s work has been performed. Consider two composers, Sterngrab and Grotesteen, who compose quartets with identical S/PM structures; suppose even that they share the same musico-historical context. Now imagine that the Aloysious Ensemble, who are great friends of Sterngrab, give the ill-attended première of Sterngrab's Quartet Opus 21. Clearly, the Aloysious have performed Sterngrab's Quartet Opus 21—but have they also performed Grotesteen's Quartet Opus 21? I think not. Why? For several reasons:

<sup>29</sup> I will take this opportunity to point out that although aesthetic and artistic attributes have played a large role in this paper, I have not insisted on them as *essential* to musical works, but only as relevant—in common with all other attributes—to *individuating* them. The argument has nowhere required as a premise that such attributes are essential attributes. It has assumed only that aesthetic/artistic attributes *truly belong* to works in a *reasonably determinate* fashion. As for what attributes *are* essential to musical works, given MW, it seems that certain structural and genetic attributes would have to be admitted: S/PM structure, composer, date of composition. But it is not obvious that aesthetic/artistic attributes will turn out to be essential, i.e., possessed by a work in all possible worlds it inhabits. Consider a possible world in which Schoenberg determines the S/PM structure of *Verklärte Nacht* during 1899 but in which Wagner had never existed. The resultant work might still be *Verklärte Nacht*, though some of its aesthetic/artistic attributes would be subtly different.

<sup>30</sup> Quandaries arise when these considerations conflict, which I will not attempt to deal with here. For example, suppose the Aloysious Ensemble are actually reading copies of Grotesteen's score while believing themselves to be playing Sterngrab's score. Do they perform Sterngrab's Quartet, Grotesteen's Quartet, or both?

they don't know Grotesteen; they weren't using Grotesteen's scores; they didn't believe themselves to be presenting Grotesteen's work—in short, there was no connection between their performance and Grotesteen the creator. Grotesteen's creating his Opus 21 Quartet had nothing whatever to do with the sound event produced by the Aloysius Ensemble on the afore-mentioned occasion. Now, if Sterngrab's Quartet has performances that Grotesteen's does not, and *vice versa*, then, again by Leibniz's law, Sterngrab's and Grotesteen's quartets cannot be identical. On proposal MW', Sterngrab and Grotesteen have composed the same musical work; on proposal MW, their works are distinct. That MW squares with this intuition regarding identification of performances is thus one more point in its favor.

I therefore rest with the account of musical works represented by MW. In the next section I offer some remarks on performances and transcriptions in light of this account.

## VI

(1) On my view, the following must all be distinguished: (a) instances of *W*; (b) instances of the sound structure of *W*; (c) instances of the S/PM structure of *W*; (d) performances of *W*. An *instance* of a musical work *W* is a sound event which conforms *completely* to the sound/performance-means structure of *W* and which exhibits the required connection<sup>31</sup> to the indicative activity wherein *W*'s composer *A* creates *W*. An instance of *W* is typically produced, either directly or indirectly, from a score that can be causally traced and is intentionally related by the performer, to the act of creation of *W* by *A*. Thus, all instances of *W* are instances of *W*'s sound structure, and instances of *W*'s S/PM structure—but the reverse is not the case.

Instances are a subclass of the set of performances of a work. A *performance* of a musical work *W* is a sound event which is *intended* to instantiate *W*—i.e., represents an attempt to exemplify *W*'s S/PM structure in accordance with *A*'s indication of it<sup>32</sup>—and which *succeeds to a reasonable degree*.<sup>33</sup> Since one cannot instanti-

<sup>31</sup> I will assume here that the required connection is primarily, if not wholly, intentional.

<sup>32</sup> And thus an attempt to exemplify an S/PM-as-indicated-by-X-at-*t*.

<sup>33</sup> What constitutes a “reasonable degree,” and thus what differentiates poor or marginal performance from nonperformance, is for many compositions perhaps marked by the ability of an informed and sensitive listener to grasp, at least roughly, what S/PM structure is struggling to be presented. For example, even an especially informed and sensitive listener would grasp approximately nothing of the Hammerklavier Sonata from my attempt to present its structure,

ate a musical work—an S/PM structure-as-indicated-by-X-at-*t*—without intending to, because instantiating *that* demands conscious guidance by instructions, memories, or the like which one regards as deriving from *A*'s indicative act at *t*, it follows that the instances of *W* are all to be found among the performances of *W*. However, not all performances of *W* count as instances of *W*; many if not most attempts to exemplify S/PM structures fail by some margin. So these cannot count as instances of *W*, but they *are* performances—namely *incorrect* performances. (Of course, that they are strictly incorrect by no means entails that they are bad.) There are not, however, any incorrect *instances* of *W*; the *correct* performances of *W* are its instances, and no others.<sup>34</sup>

Finally, let me note that musical works as I understand them *can* be heard in or through their performances. One *hears* an S/PM structure-as-indicated-by-X-at-*t* whenever one hears an instance of that S/PM structure produced by performers who, roughly speaking, are guided by X's indication of the S/PM structure in question. And one *knows* precisely what musical work, i.e., structure-as-indicated, one is hearing if one knows what creative act is in effect the guiding source of the sound event being produced.

(2) On my view of what a musical work (of the paradigm sort) is, it follows immediately that a transcription of a musical work is a distinct musical work, whether it involves alteration of the sound structure (the normal case), or *even* of just the performance-means structure. It is a virtue of my view that it gives a clear answer to this question, which is often thought to be only arbitrarily decidable. If we want such pieces to have the definite aesthetic qualities we take them to have, instrumentation must be considered inseparable from them. Thus, we need not rely, in endorsing the distinct-

since my facility at the piano is next to nil—no performance (much less an instance) of the Hammerklavier Sonata can issue from me or my ilk.

<sup>34</sup> Thus I am in opposition to Wolterstorff's suggestion, in "Toward an Ontology of Artworks," *op. cit.*, that musical works be construed as norm-kinds, i.e., as having correct and incorrect, or proper and improper, or standard and defective instances. What we say about musical works can, I think, be more perspicuously interpreted in terms of the distinction between instance and performance. Further, construing instance as requiring full conformity to score (i.e., as an all-or-none proposition) has the virtue, as Nelson Goodman pointed out in *Languages of Art* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968), of assuring preservation of a work's identity from work to instance and from instance to work. But by also distinguishing between instance and performance (which Goodman does not do) one can sweeten the judgment, say, that Rubinstein's playing of the Chopin Ballade No. 3 with two mistakes is not an *instance* of the work, with the willing admission that it is surely a *performance* of it (and possibly a great one).

ness position on transcriptions vis-à-vis original works, merely on the principle of fidelity to the composer's intended instrumentation. Rather we are also constrained by higher-order considerations of preserving the aesthetic integrity of such pieces.

In conclusion, let me stress some obvious consequences of accepting the theory of the musical work that I have proposed. First, composers would retain the status of creator in the strictest sense. Second, musical composition would be revealed as necessarily personalized. Third, musical composition could not fail to be seen as a historically rooted activity whose products must be understood with reference to their points of origin. Fourth, it would be recognized that the pure sound structure of a musical work, while graspable in isolation, does not exhaust the work structurally, and thus that the underlying means of performance must be taken into account as well if the work is to be correctly assessed.<sup>35</sup>

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#### ON WORKS OF VIRTUOSITY

HERE are artworks in which technical skill is an important ingredient, not merely as something required to produce the artwork, but in the deeper sense that it penetrates and partly determines the nature of the artwork itself. The Chopin études, for example, are generally admitted to be masterpieces of music, but it is obvious that the development and display of skill in piano playing enters essentially into their composition. Indeed, as I shall explain more fully later, piano playing is what the études are about. As another example, consider the still life paintings by various Dutch artists of the seventeenth century, in which such objects as crystal goblets, jewelry, glass spheres, dewdrops, and oysters

<sup>35</sup> It is worth observing that, if the position developed in this paper is correct, it may have interesting implications not only for the identity of other sorts of art work (this I take to be obvious), but for the identity of abstract cultural objects of various sorts—e.g., scientific theories, speeches, laws, games. A physical theory, for example, can't be *simply* a set of sentences, propositions, or equations *if* it is in fact the possessor of properties such as brilliance, revolutionariness, derivativeness, immediate acceptance. For that very set of sentences, propositions, or equations might be found in another theory occurring fifty years earlier or later which lacked those properties.